Legal History
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court holds that, although Title IX does not express any private right of action, Title IX is enforceable by private plaintiffs in an implied private right of action.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court holds that money damages are available in a private right of action to enforce Title IX.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) and Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court rules that Title IX permits claims against educational institutions for “deliberate indifference” to sexual harassment that is so severe that it effectively bars access to an educational opportunity or benefit.
In a 7-2 ruling in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court re-affirms that under federal law, the Statute of Limitations begins at the time an injury occurs, unless otherwise explicitly stated in federal law, for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Courts, including the Sixth Circuit in Snyder-Hill v. The Ohio State University, 48 F.4th 686 (6th Cir. 2022), have held the Statute of Limitations begins to run at the same time for Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
In a 6-3 ruling in McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019), the U.S. Supreme Court again upholds the presumption that the Statute of Limitations begins at the time an injury occurs for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Courts, including the Sixth Circuit in Snyder-Hill v. The Ohio State University, 48 F.4th 686 (6th Cir. 2022), have held the Statute of Limitations begins to run at the same time for Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
In an 8-1 ruling in Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019), U.S. Supreme Court again upholds the presumption that Statutes of Limitations under federal law begin at the time an injury occurs, unless expressly stated otherwise in federal law.